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PRICING, PATENT LOSS AND THE MARKET FOR PHARMACEUTICALS
ABSTRACT
Empirical studies suggest that entry of generic competitors
results in minimal decreases or even increases in brand-name drug
prices as well as sharp declines in brand-name advertising. This
paper examines circumstances under which this empirical pattern
could be observed.
The analysis focuses on models where the demand for brand-
name pharmaceuticals is divided into two segments, only one of
which is cross-price-sensitive. Brand-name finns are assumed to
set price and advertising in a Stackelberg context; they allow
for responses by generic producers but the latter take decisions
by brand-name f inns as given. Brand-name price and advertising
responses to entry are shown to depend upon the properties of the
reduced-form brand-name demand function. Conditions for positive
price responses and negative advertising responses are derived.
We also examine the implications for brand-name price
levels, and for the brand-name price response to entry, of health
sector trends (such as increasing HMO enrollments) that may have
the effect of expanding the size of the cross-price-sensitive
segment of the market. The paper concludes with a review of
recent empirical research and suggestions for future work on the
effects of generic entry.
Richard G. Frank David S. Salkever
School of Hygiene and Department of Health
Public Health Services R&D Policy and Management
The Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and
624 North Broadway Public Health




and NBER"...whole drugs which the best employed apothecary, in
a large town, will sell in a year, may not perhaps cost
him above thirty or forty pounds. Though he should
sell them, therefore for three or four hundred, or at a
thousand percent profit, this may frequently be no more
than reasonable wages..."
Adam Smith
The WeGith of Nations, 1776
I. Introduction
Over the past twenty years public policy makers have often
attempted to balance concerns over price levels of prescription
drugs with the desire to encourage innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry. The Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984 very clearly reflects the
determination of policy makers to simultaneously address issues
of price control and technical progress. The 1984 Act increased
returns to innovation by extending the period of patent
protection to take into account the time between receipt of a
patent and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a drug
for sale in the market.
The 1984 Act also reduced the testing requirements for
approval of new generic brands of existing chemical entities,
thus reducing entry barriers in markets where patents have
expired. The expected outcome from eased entry conditions for
generic substitutes was substantially enhanced price competition
and lower prices for brand name drugs. In fact, prices for brand
name drugs have tended to increase following entry by generics.
Wagner and Duff y (1988) examined price changes for top selling
generics and name brands. They show substantial price increases
in brand name prices accompanying large reductions in genericprices as entry of generics occurs. Grabowski and Vernon (1990)
examined data on 18 major orally—administered drug products
subject to generic competition between 1983 and 1987, and found
that the name brand price increased by an average of 7% one year
subsequent to generic entry and 11% two years following generic
entry.
The main goal of this paper is to examine how entry by
generics can lead to price increases for brand name drugs. We
take as a point of departure the observation made frequently by
others (Hurwitz and Caves 1988, Wagner and Duffy 1988, U.s.
Congress Special Committee on Aging 1990, Grabowski and Vernon
1990) that the demand side of the market for prescription drugs
consists of two segments. One segment (consisting largely of
hospitals, 1*lOs and Medicaid patients) is sensitive to
differences between brand—name and generic prices, while the
other (mainly comprised of individuals purchasing drugs in a
retail outlet based on prescriptions from office—based
physicians), is not sensitive to these price differences.1 We
examine models based on this characterization of demand to
determine the circumstances under which price increases in
response to market entry by generics will occur!
1Medicaidis a major purchaser of pharmaceutical products.
A number of states will only reimburse sellers for the price of a
generic product if one exists. Others deny reimbursement for costly
drug products. The reimbursable products are listed in a state's
Medicaid formulary.
2Grabowski and Vernon (1990) offer a specific example where a
profit—maximizing firm would increase price in response to entry.
Our purpose is to provide a more general characterization of the
2A second facet of our analysis concerns the simultaneous
response of brand—name advertising and brand—name price to
generic entry. Since there is some evidence from two recent
studies (Hurwitz and Caves 1988; Caves, Whinston and Hurwjtz
1991) that advertising tends to fall with generic entry, we
explore the conditions under which this can occur in tandem with
a positive price response to entry.
The paper is organized into five sections. The next section
presents a simple brand name pricing model based on market
segmentation. In addition to describing the conditions under
which generic entry increases brand—name price in this model, we
also consider whether recent institutional trends in the health
sector, which are changing the relative magnitudes of the two
segments of market demand, will alter these conditions. The
simple model is extended to incorporate advertising in the third
section. The fourth section reviews recent empirical evidence of
price increasing entry and advertising responses to entry. A
final section offers conclusions and observations on future
research and policy directions.
II. A Simple Market Segmentation Model
A. Background
We noted above that one could view the demand for brand—name
prescription drugs as composed of two segments, one in which
buyers are sensitive to prices of generic equivalents and one in
cases where this would be true.
3which they are not.3 Recent developments in the health care
sector have enlarged the cross—price sensitive seqment of the
market. Hospitals are increasingly being paid under reimbursement
arrangements which create incentives to reduce the costs per
admission (Lave 1989 and Rosko and Broyles 1989). Foremost among
these arrangements has been the introduction of the Medicare
Prospective Payment System (PPS). The per case prospective
payment approach to reimbursement, adopted under PPS, pays
hospitals a fixed amount for each admission based in part on a
patient's diagnosis.' Thus the marginal revenues stemming from
any treatment activities subsequent to admission are zero. This
creates strong incentives for hospitals to be price sensitive in
their input purchasing activities. Pharmaceuticals represent an
important set of treatment inputs.
The new financial incentives appear to have altered the
behavior of hospitals over time. Hospitals are increasingly
adopting policies that are aimed at reducing pharmaceutical
There have been a number of models in the literature that
are concerned with entry which leads to price increases in
oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive markets (Rosenthal
1980, Salop 1979 and Satterthwaite 1979). These models generate
price increases in response via one of two general mechanisms.
The first is to assume economies of scale (Salop 1979) .Asecond
approach is for entry to both shift demand curves and to make
them less elastic (Rosenthal 1980 and Satterthwaite 1979). Our
analysis takes the second general approach.
The PPS system bases its payments on the national
historical average costs of care for patients falling into each
of approximately 470 diagnostic clusters. In addition, hospitals
may receive special adjustments to their payment rate based on
whether they are teaching hospitals, serve disproportionate
shares of indigent patients etc.
4costs. Stolar (1988) reports that from 1985 to 1987 the portion
of hospitals with a policy of an automatic exchange of
therapeutic alternatives, based on price, increased from 47.5% to
52.5%. In addition the percentage which placed restrictions on
certain high cost drugs grew from 25.7% in 1985 to 27.7% in 1987.
These data suggest that a significant share of hospitals are
making generic vs. brand name price comparisons in pharmaceutical
purchasing, and that this share is growing over time.
A second part of the cross—price sensitive segment of the
market for pharmaceuticals consists of Health Maintenance
Organizations (liMOs). liMOs provide health care coverage and
services for roughly 11% of the U.S. population (Interstudy
1989). They generally offer relatively extensive coverage for
prescription pharmaceuticals (Gold et al 1989). Since liMOs
receive a fixed payment for providing individuals with an agreed
upon set of health care services (usually with little or no cost
sharing), WIGs usually receive no marginal revenue associated
with any services. The 11110's incentive is to treat each case as
economically as possible. HNOs are therefore likely to be
sensitive to generic vs. brand name price differences. This is
supported by data from Weiner et al. (1989) that on average 31%
of all liMO pharmacy claims are for generics, while in insurance
plans that cover fee—for—service medical practice the generic
share of claims is only about
Research by Statman (1981) and Bond and Lean (1977)
suggest that physicians have considerable loyalty to name brand
drugs regardless of price. This is in part evidenced by very low
5A recent survey of HMOs (Doering 1988) ascertained the
extent of therapeutic substitution of generic for brand name
pharmaceuticals. Approximately 31% of the surveyed }1140s used
therapeutic substitution. Thirty-six percent of the liMOs that
did not make use of therapeutic substitution refrained because it
would violate state law.
Medicaid programs account for roughly 50% of third party
payments for pharmaceutical products. State Medicaid programs
have adopted several strategies for encouraging use of generic
substitutes by beneficiaries (Kushner and Feirman 1986). One
approach is to set reimbursement levels to pharmacists for drugs
at the price of the generic products in the chemical class, if
they exist. Another approach, used by one third of the states, is
to define a set of drugs for which Medicaid will reimburse
sellers. Some very costly drugs are excluded from this Medicaid
formulary and are therefore not eligible for reimbursement
(Dranove 1989).
B. Assumptions
Our analysis of brand name price responses to market entry
begins by assuming that the brand name producer is a dominant
firm that incorporates price responses of generics to its own
pricing decisions while the generic producers are fringe fins
that take the brand name price as given.(Thus, our model is a
Stackelberg game.) Data on market shares of brand name and
rates of generic prescribing by office based physicians (Masson
and Steiner 1985 and Hurwitz and Caves 1988).
6generic products are consistent with this characterization
(Comanor 1986, Hurwitz and Caves 1988). The profit maximizing
brand name producer is assumed to face a product market that is
divided into two segments: loyal customers (DL) whose demand is
unaffected by the price of generic substitutes and a cross—price—
sensitive segment (Di) whose demand is influenced by both the
brand name and generic prices (Rosenthal 1980).
Our one period model assumes that barriers to entry for
generics are low, as is implied by the provisions of the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Wagner
and Puffy 1988), and that the costs of changing both brand name
and generic prices are low. This implies that future entry
decisions will not be affected by the current brand name price.
The brand name firm is assumed to be aware of this and hence sets
price in each time period taking as exogenous the number of
current and future generic producers, denoted by n.6 The
generic market is characterized by a Nash equilibrium among the n
6Thus, we exclude the possibility of "limit price" behavior.
Tirole (1988, Chapter 9), points out that limit pricing is unlikely
under the assumptions we have outlined. He notes that incumbent
(brand—name) price may be correlated with productive capacity
commitment; however, capacity constraints are probably not an
important consideration in producing pharmaceuticals (though they
may become more important in the market for biologically—produced
products).Moreover, the Milgrom—Roberts (1982) explanation of
limit pricing where incumbent price is an imperfect signal of
incumbent cost is also of limited relevance in the pharmaceutical
context where production costs are small relative to prices and
relative to total firm expenditures on drug development,
production, marketing and distribution.
7identical firms who take brand name price Cb) as given.7
C. The Model
The brand name producer's demand function is
(1) =DL(Pb)+DS(Pb,P9)
where Qbisthe name brand quantity demanded, P6 and P are the
brand name and generic prices respectively, and D1 and
represent the loyal and cross—price sensitive segments of the
brand name firm's demand function. The market demand function for
the n identical generic producers is DG(Pg,Pb) and the equilibrium
value of P9 is Pg*(n,Pb).8 This is the profit maximizing value of
P9 in a Nash non—cooperative game. Substituting the expression
for into equation (1), and denoting the brand name producer's
cost function by C(Qb), we write the brand name fin's profit
function as
(2) =Pb.{DL(Pb)+ Ds((Pb, Pg*(fllPb)J)
—C{DL(Pb)+ DS[Pb, Pg*(fl,Pb)]J
Maximization of profit with respect to ownprice(rb)yieldsthe
first order condition
71n order to examine the sensitivity of our results to the
assumption that the generic price is endogenous to the brand—name
firm, we also examined a Bertrand model in which this firm takes
generic price as exogenous. The analytical results closely
parallel the findings reported here.
The relationship between P9 and n can also be derived
from more general models where n identical firms have non—zero
conjectural variations with respect to each other's output (see
for example Waterston (1987) pp.18—20).
8dndD 8D3 3D a; dc (3)ai=°di (Pb——_)+DL(rb)÷D$(pb,p;(fl,pb))
Notethat the first term of (3), which summarizes the demand
response to a change in b' must be negative for the firstorder
condition to hold. The demand response consists of the direct
effects on the two segments of the demand function plus an
indirect effect which works through the price reaction function
that is determined in the sub—narket for generics. For given
values of n, DL(Pb) +D,(P, Pg*(n,Pb)] can be viewed as the
reduced—form demand curve for the brand—name firm. Equation (3)
requires that this reduced-form demand curve be negatively
sloped.'
The effect of entry by generics on name brand price can be
assessed by total differentiation of equation (3) to obtain an
expression f or dPb/dn. Using this expression, we examine the
conditions under which market entry will increase name brand
price (dPb/dn>O). (Algebraic detail is supplied in the appendix).
We can express dPb/dn as:
/8P, >0,the reduced form demand curve will be less
own—price e1astic than the ordinary demand curve for the brand name
drug.
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whereSocisthe right—hand—side (r.h.s.) of the second—order
condition (Al. in the appendix) and must be negative. With
3D5/8P9 >0and 8P9*Jan c 0, the second right—hand term in (4)
must be negative. The third right-hand term must also be non—
positive, since the reduced—form demand curve slopes downward,
unless there are decreasing marginal costs for the brand—name
firm. The first bracketed term on the right hand side of (4) is
the mark—up of name brand price over marginal cost (which must be
positive). The second bracketed term is the effect of generic
entry on the slope of the reduced f on demand curve. The sign of
this term is difficult to determine a priori. The slope of the
price—sensitive portion of the reduced—form demand curve
summarizes heterogenous responses of individual cross—price
sensitive buyers to price increases which may be of two types:
reducing the quantity purchased to some non—zero amount and
reducing purchases to zero. The reduction in as n increases
could affect this slope by affecting either or both types of
responses. If for example, the purchasers with the strongest
own—price response are more likely to reduce their purchases to
zero as Pg* falls, this will result in a steeper slope for the
10reduced-form demand curve since the remaining cross—price
sensitive purchasers have (by assumption) weaker price responses.
Equation (4) shows that dPb/dn can not be positive unless
either 1) entry increases the demand tar the brand name drug, 2)
marginal costs are decreasing for the brand—name product or 3)
entry makes the reduced—form demand curve steeper (less elastic).
Of course, the first of these possibilities seems rather
implausible since it would require that generic prices rise with
entry or that brand—name demand falls when generic prices rise
(implying that the products are gross complements in demand).
The empirical evidence of the impact on demand suggests at least
small reductions in brand name market shares following market
entry (Statman 1981). Little systematic empirical work on the
nature of returns to scale has been reported in the literature.
There is, however, little reason to believe that the marginal
production costs of a specific drug would be decreasing, nor has
this claim appeared in industry studies (Comanor 1986, Temin
1979). This leaves the third possibility, that entry makes the
reduced—form demand curve steeper, as the most plausible
explanation for dPb/dn >0.
U. Variations in Market Shares of Loyal and Cross-Price-
Sensitive Consumers
We have already cited evidence pertaining to liMO's, hospital
purchasing practices, and Medicaid which suggests that the
relative market share of price—sensitive consumers has been
increasing. We now consider the implications of this trend for
brand—name prices and for the responses of these prices to
11generic entry. We begin by reformulating the brand—name demand
function in equation (1) as a weighted sum
Cia) Qb=(l—a)DL(Pb)+aD$(Pb)
where a is the weight of price—sensitive consumers in the market.
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Notethat the numerator of the first r.h.s. term in (5) is
proportional to the difference in own—price response of the loyal
and cross—price—sensitive reduced—form demand curves while the
numerator of the second r.h.s. term is the difference in quantity
demanded between the loyal and cross—price—sensitive portions of
the market. If •one assumes that the shift of a purchaser from
the former to the latter portion (which causes an increase in a)
does not affect the quantity demanded for that purchaser (given
12prevailing levels of b and Pg) ,thesecond r.h.s. term vanishes.
The first r.h.s. term will be negative (positive) if theown—
price response of the cross—price sensitive demand is greater
(lesser) than that of the loyal purchasers. While this might
seem plausible, it is not obviously so; in particular, one might
expect the response of reduced—form demand to be smaller for the
cross—price sensitive purchasers if is strongly positive.
It is also interesting to consider the effect of changes in
a on the response of btoentry. Grabowski and Vernon (1990)
noted that brand—name price declines in response to entry were
more commonly observed for injectable products that are purchased
primarily by cross-price—sensitive hospitals. They went on to
speculate that in the market for the orally—administered
pharmaceuticals which they studied, the effect of expanding the
cross—price—sensitive portion of the market (i.e., an increase in
a) would be to make dPb/dn more negative. To examine their
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Notice that the term (v—z(2Pb-m)) will be negative if dPb/dn>O.
In this case, since SOC<O, sufficient conditions for the validity
ofthe Grabowski—Vernon conjecture are that (bL—b$+zn)<O and (Q—
QL)￿O.Ontheother hand, as noted above, the difference in own—
priceresponses of the two demand functions, which here equals
(b1—b+zn),may not be negative,particularly if is
strongly positive. Thus, while our analysis does not controvert
the Grabowski—Vernon conjecture, itdoes point out thatthere are
plausible cases where it does not hold. Finally, note that the
samefactors which implya less positive brand—name price
response to entry as a increases (i.e., COand(bL—bS+zn)<O)
alsoimply that dPb/da <0.
III.Advertising: Extending the Basic Model
There has been a substantial amount of research on the
impact of advertising (or promotion) on competition and
innovation in the market for pharmaceuticals (Comanor 1986). Far
less attention appears to have been devoted to the impact of
generic entry on brand—name advertising. Since there is
empirical evidence (discussed below) that generic entry reduces
brand—name advertising, we focus our analysis on exploring the
conditions under which this decline in advertising would occur
simultaneously with a rise in brand—name price.
14Several competitive roles for the influence of advertising
on competition have been proposed in the literature. Leffler
(1981) describes informational advertising which serves to
improve consumer knowledge. The effect of informational
advertising for a name brand firm may be to increase aggregate
demand for a class of pharmaceuticals, or to increase its own
demand if there exist true quality differentials that can be
publicized. Persuasive advertising constitutes a second class of
promotional activity. This form of advertising is posited to make
firmdemandcurves less price elastic.
Comanor (1986) suggested that name brand fins may use
advertising to "jam" the informational signal sent by generic
entrants thereby reducing the "effective" information received
about competitors. Schmalensee (1982) has developed a general
model where advertising serves to reinforce existing brand
loyalties, which results in name brand demand curves becoming
less price elastic. Still others have suggested that advertising
raises the costs of entry thereby reducing potential price
competitors (Schwartzman 1976).
We expand our basic model by adding expenditures on
advertising, A, as a second decision variable for the brand name
firm. By adding A as an argument in the D1, O, and P* functions
the first order condition given in (3) becomes
(3b) ÷D(•)
15(3c) to=+P+PP!!l1p -Ac.-1 3A a4aA 8Pa4J[
b
Equation(3b) is identical to (3) above. Equation (3c) states
that at the optimum, a brand name firm will expand advertising
expenditures up to the point where the additional sales revenue
minus production cost generated by the marginal dollar of
advertising expenditure is unity. (Equations 3b and 3c correspond
to the standard Dorfman—Steiner (1954) result.) By totally
differentiating (Sb) and (Sc) and allowing n, A, b'andP9 to
vary we can derive expressions for dPb/dn and dA/dn. Detailed
derivations of these expressions are presented in the appendix.
Under the maintained assumption of constant marginal costs,
sufficient conditions in this model for predicting dPb/dn >0and
dA/dn <0are the following: (1) entry makes the reduced—torn
brand—name demand curve substantially steeper, (2) advertising
has a negative effect on the (negative) reduced—form demand
response to entry, and (3) advertising makes the reduced—form
demand curve substantially flatter. The mathematical statement
of these conditions (given in the appendix) is that (1) n >0,
(2) nb c 0 and (3) Aa <0.(See the discussion in the appendix
and equations (A4), (AS), and (A7)—(A9) for definitions of these
terms.) Condition (1) is the same condition required for a
positive brand—name price response to entry in the basic model
(Section II.C above) Conditions 2 and 3 seem likely to be met
if brand—name advertising is market expanding, that is, if it
16increases the number of persons using a drug or increases the
uses to which the drug is put. In this case, the reduction in
quantity demanded as entry occurs (and P falls) should also be
larger. Advertising could, however, have the opposite result.
If brand—name advertising focuses primarily on differentiating
brand—name from genetic products, it may diminish the cross—price
sensitivity of brand-name demand and thereby reduce the size of
the (negative) demand response to entry. Finally, note that our
model does not generate qualitative predictions about the signs
of dPb/dn and dAfdn in a number of other cases (see Appendix
Table 1). These cases could also be consistent with the observed
empirical evidence of simultaneous brand—name price increases and
advertising decreases in response to entry.
IV. Empirical Evidence on Pricing. Advertising and Patent
Expiration
There are three studies which directly estimate impacts of
market entry on name brand prices. Two of the studies make use of
data which reflect pricing behavior during the period subsequent
to the Drug Act of 1984 (Grabowski and Vernon 1990 and Caves,
Whinston and Hurwitz 1991)
The earliest study which is relevant to the models developed
above is that by Statman (1981). In that work the pricing
behavior of 12 name brand drugs was examined before and after
expiration of their patents. The analysis focused on prices and
purchases by drug stores. The empirical estimates of price
response and market share changes indicated little change in
either. On average market share fell to 96% of its initial level.
17only one of the 12 brand name prices fell significantly following
patent expiration. This evidence does not support the proposition
that prices will increase following patent expiration. The very
small market share changes suggest very low generic—price
elasticity of brand-name demand; thus, the entry—induced shift in
the slope of the brand—name reduced form demand curve may not
have been sufficient to create the types of responses outlined
above. 10
Grabowskiand Vernon (1990) studied the effect of generic
entry on prices for 18 high sales volume pharmaceutical products
that were first exposed to generic competition during the years
1983 through 1987. For each drug the authors examined prices
prior to entry and prices 1 year subsequent to generic entry.
Using a rather sparse regression model they estimated the impact
of the number of generic suppliers in a market on the ratio of
10Earlier studies of drug pricing by Schwartzman (1976) and
Weston (1979) found little evidence of brand—name price responses
to entry outside the market for anti—infectives. Moreover, the
estimates produced by those studies are somewhat difficult to
interpret. Since only simple regression models were estimated, it
is not possible to disentangle the impacts of increased
competition in a therapeutic market from the aging of particular
pharmaceutical products. Most other studies have focused on entry
by new drugs into a therapeutic class. That situation is somewhat
different from the one examined in the theoretical work above.
Some results from those studies are informative for the analysis
of patent loss and price competition. The study by Bond and Lean
(1977) found that physician prescribing practices were quite
unresponsive to newly entering drugs that offer little or no
therapeutic gain over the original product. This is not
necessarily informative because in our model we view demand
stemming from office based physician contacts as falling into the
"loyal" market segment; the effect of entry on the price
responsivesegment of the market is the critical factor in
explaining post—entry brand-name price increases.
18the generic price to the name brand price.1' The estimated
coefficient for the effect of the number of generics on the ratio
of generic to name brand price is negative and significant at
conventional levels. This result is consistent With the
descriptive statistics presented by Grabowski and Vernon (1990)
showing that name brand prices rose relative to generic prices
subsequent to generic entry.
In an interesting and comprehensive study of generic entry
effects on markets for brand-name drugs, Caves, Whinston and
Hurwitz (1991) suggest that simple pre—entry versus post—entry
brand—name price comparisons or regressions of price on numbers
of generic entrants may understate negative entry effects on
prices because other omitted factors have caused brand—name
prices to rise over time.
-
Inparticular, they observe that after
1982 the Producer Price Index (PPI) for pharmaceuticals rose
sharply relative to indices of labor and material input costs.
Lacking observable variables which can explain this deviation
from historical patterns, they argue that empirical price
regression models must be specified so as to minimize bias from
the unobservable, time—varying factors which have produced this
result.12
The regression included two covariates along with the
number of generics. They were: (1) the total dollar sales in a
market in a given year and (2) a time dummy.
'21t should be noted that Berndt, Griliches and Rosett (1990)
have argued that rates of increase in the PPI data for drugs over
the recent past have been biased upward by a substantial amount.
Their analysis shows that one reason for this bias is the
difference in price behavior between the drug products included in
19In their own empirical analyses of brand—name prices, Caves,
Whinston and I-iurwitz examine the experience of 30 drugs in seven
therapeutic categories that went off patent during the period
1976 through 1987. These drugs represented all drugs in
therapeutic classes where "important" drugs had lost their
patents for which data on patent expiration dates were precise.
In their regression model of the impact of generic entry on
brand—name prices, more than fifty individual intercepts were
included for each of the year—therapeutic category combinations
in their data. (This necessitated dropping two of the 30 drugs
which were the only ones in their therapeutic categories.) Their
regression results therefore represent an analysis of deviations
in individual drug price changes from the therapeutic category—
year group average changes in each year. In addition, a number
of other time—related dummyvariables,linear time trends and
quadratic time trends were included to capture presumed
discontinuities in behavior around the initial year on the
market, the years before and after patent expiration and product
life—cycle effects.
The measure of entry used was the number of Amended New
Drug Applications for marketing of a particular chemical entity;
actual entry was not directly measured. The estimated regressions
indicated that the initial entry of generics led to reductions in
name brand price of roughly 2%. Entry by 20 generics resulted in
estimated name brand price reductions of 17%. These were viewed
the PpI sample and the universe of drug products.
20as small price responses to entry. Analyses that allowed for
different price responses to entry depending on the importance of
hospital purchasers indicated more negative price responses to
entry when the hospital market share was larger. In view of the
very complicated structure of additional time—related variables
in the model, however, it would be important to know the
sensitivity of these results to the precise specification chosen
by the authors.
Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz also estimated a regression
model for the ratio of generic to brand—name prices similar to
that estimated by Grabowski and Vernon. Their only explanatory
variables were the number of generic entrants and the square of
this number. Individual intercepts were included for each drug
but no time—related or year—related dummies were included. Their
results paralleled Grabowski and Vernon in that increasing the
number of generic entrants had a strong downward effect on
generic prices relative to brand—name prices; in particular, the
generic—brand name price ratio was estimated to fall from 0.599
to 0.201 as the number of entrants increased from one to 20.
Several recent empirical studies have reported the result
that generic entry reduces brand—name advertising. Hurwitz and
Caves (1988) examined the relationship between promotional
activities, especially advertising, and market shares using data
on 150 drug products for the years 1978 to 1983. The econometric
model of advertising and market share yielded estimates of the
impact of number of sellers on the advertising effort of the
21leading firm (as measured by the advertising to sales ratio and
total promotional outlays). The results indicate a negative
relationship between the number of firms in the market and both
measures of advertising.13
Caves, Whinston and i-{urwitz (1991) modeled the response of
advertising expenditures to entry of generic competitors for 25
drugs that (1) went oft patent during the period 1976—1987 and
(2) reported more than 80 per cent of their sales revenues from
non—hospital pharmacies. Advertising expenditures were regressed
on explanatory variables relating to the years after first sale
of the brand—name drug (to capture product life—cycle effects),
number of approved generic equivalent drugs (their measure of
entry), dummy variables for the two years before patent
expiration and the year after patent expiration, and a variable
measuring years since patent expiration. Their results indicated
strong negative effects of entry on advertising with the first
approved generic producing a fall of 20 per cent and additional
entrants up to ten producing additional declines of 60 per
cent. 14
13 The estimatefor effect of the number of sellers on the
advertising to sales ratio was negative with a t statistic of
1.62 which is significant at the 0.10 level using a two tailed
test. The result for total promotional outlays by the leading
firm was also negative but no standard error or t statistic was.
reported (see footnote #42 in Hurwitz and Caves (1988)).
ThCaves, Whinston and Hurwitz view their finding of a negative
dA/dn as supporting the view that "expanding the overall market for
the chemical entity is a significant function of branded—drug
advertising." Of course, the analysis in our appendix shows that
the sign of dA/dn depends upon a number of different factors in
addition to the effect of advertising on the level of demand. Our
22In summary, the results from the three most relevant
empirical studies of brand name pricing are decidedly mixed. The
descriptive evidence strongly suggests price increases following
entry (Grabowski and Vernon 1990 and Wagner and Duffy 1988). The
nultivariate analyses are less clear on the point. This may in
part result from data limitations that hinder the ability to hold
constant many relevant factors (Grabowski and Vernon 1990) .None
of the studies suggests strong name brand price reductions in
response to generic entry. The empirical results for the impact
of generic entry on advertising (Hurwitz and Caves 1988; Caves,
Whinston and Hurwitz 1991) is more consistent in pointing to a
strong post—entry decline in advertising, but the number of
studies dealing with this issue is still small.
V. Concluding Remarks
The models we have developed above show that price increases
in name brand pharmaceutical products stemming from market entry
due to patent loss may be explained by optimizing behavior by the
name brand producer. On the assumption that marginal drug
production costs are approximately constant, analysis of our
basic model indicates that a necessary condition for such price
increases is that entry leads to a decline in the own—price
elasticity of reduced-form brand—name demand. Analysis of a
model incorporating advertising shows that with constant marginal
costs, sufficient conditions for simultaneous brand—name price—
overall analysis, however, supports this intuition of Caves,
Whinston and Hurwitz about the nature of advertising.
23increases and advertising decreases in response to entry are that
(1) entry leads to a substantial decline in the own—price
elasticity of reduced—form brand—name demand;
(2) increased advertising leads to a substantial decrease in
the slope of the reduced—form brand—name demand curve; and
(3) advertising has a negative effect on the (negative)
reduced—form demand response to entry.
We also note that advertising which is market-expanding is most
likely to be consistent with conditions (2) and (3). More
generally, our analysis shows that the observed patterns of entry
effects on prices and advertising can be explained by the
properties of the reduced—form brand—name demand function and the
nature of brand—name advertising.
Our analysis also examined the implications, for brand—name
prices and entry effects on these prices, of relative growth in
the cross—price—sensitive share of the demand side of the
pharmaceutical market. The principal conclusion was that this
relative growth would tend to reduce prices and increase the
downward pressure of entry on prices if (1) the process causing
this relative growth did not increase the overall level of brand—
name demand and (2) the reduced—f on demand curve for cross—
price—sensitive buyers was more own—price elastic than was the
demand curve for other ("loyal") buyers.
One outcome that is consistent with our model and supported
by descriptive statistics is that brand—name price rises while
the average price (including both brand-name and generic
products) of a prescription falls. This would mean that the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984 would be
24having its desired effect. Moreover, our results at least point
to the possibility that name—brand price increases in response to
entry will be attenuated as the cross—price—sensitive segment of
the market continues to expand.
Future researchers may wish to explore the use of more
sophisticated models to probe further the implications of patent
loss and entry. One direction for extending this analysis is to
incorporate intertemporal demand considerations such as
durability of advertising effects (Caves, Whinston and Murwitz
1991). Grabowski and Vernon (1990) have also suggested extending
the model to allow for brand—name price effects on entry; to do
so, however, one would need to formulate convincing a priori
arguments for limit pricing behavior.
Further empirical research on the structural relationships
of our models would also be valuable. Based on our analysis,
research on demand for brand—name drugs should focus on the
effect of generic prices on own—price demand elasticity for name
brands and the effect of advertising on own—price and cross—price
elasticities. We are unaware of direct empirical estimates for
these factors in the literature. Empirical estimates of the
generic price function, P(Pb,A,n), are also needed.15
Another worthwhile direction for future empirical research
15The relative price regressions estimated by Grabowski and
Vernon (1990) and Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) might be
viewed as approximations to the P;(•) function with the elast].crty
of P* with respect to bconstrainedto 1.Neither of these
studi?es estimates advertising effects on P or unrestricted
coefficients for b•Grabowskiand Vernon also include a sales
volume variable, which might pose endogeneity problems-
25is to develop separate estimates of demand functions f or "loyal"
and cross—price—sensitive buyers. From a policy perspective,
this research would have considerable interest. With the growing
cost-consciousness of hospitals, Medicaid programs, hUbs, and
other private insurance arrangements, it is important to know the
implications of this trend for prices, for drug expenditures
under public and private insurance programs, and for the power of
generic entry to generate competitive pressures on brand—name
prices.
Finally, as Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) have noted, a
more complete understanding of the implications of patent policy
obviously requires further research on the entry process itself.
In the only econometric analysis of recent data of which we are
aware, Grabowski and Vernon (1990) have estimated a generic entry
model and reported that the brand—name price—cost margin at the
time of the first generic entry is the most important determinant
of the number of generic entrants. In view of concerns about
limit pricing models expressed above, the reasons for this
connection between mark—ups and entry are an obvious subject for
further inquiry.
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29APPENDIX
COMPARATIVE STATICS ANALYSIS OF ENTRYEFFECTS
ONBRAND-NAME PRICES
ThasicModel
We begin by noting that the second—order maximization




dP öp &Pb8PU -aii;- 8b aPhav
Denoting the right-hand side of this inequality by SOC, we obtain
the following equation by total differentiation of equation (3) in
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Rearranging the tens in (A2) yields equation (4) in the text.
Advertising Model
To facilitate the explanation of the comparative statics
analysis in equations (3b) and (3c), we begin by defining and
30interpreting several expressions. Let
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Notethat [?]<0 from the second—order conditions and that tn°)
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notethat the last bracketed term in (AS) is the effect of
advertising on the slope of the reduced—form demand curve. We also
define
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The second r.h.s. term in parentheses in (A7) is the effect of
entry on the reduced—form demand response to advertising. By
Young's theorem, this is also the effect of advertising on the
reduced—form demand response to entry. Also note that (Ab) is C0
by the second-order conditions.
Using these expressions, we can write the following results,
based on total differentiation of equations (3b) and (Dc) in the
text, for the effects of entry on equilibrium brand-name price and
advertising:




Fromthe second—order conditions, we know that (F") <0,[Ab] o,
and the denominators of (A9) and (AlO) are negative and positive
respectively.
Predictions about the signs of dPbJdn and dA/dn now depend
upon the signs of n', nb, and A' as shown in Appendix Table 1.
Under the maintained assumption that marginal costs are constant,
n' consists of two terms (see equation A4). The second of these
terms is the partial effect of entry on reduced—form brand—name
demand (holding F'b and A constant); this must be negative. For n'
to be positive, then, entry must have the effect of making the
reduced—form brand—name demand curve steeper. Similarly, A
consists of two terms (equation AS) the first of which (the partial
effect of advertising on reduced—form brand—name demand) is
positive. For A' to be negative, advertising must make the
reduced—for-rn demand curve less—steeply sloped. Finally, with
constant marginal costs nb (equation A7) contains only one term
which is negative (positive) when advertising increases (decreases)
the negative partial effect of entry on reduced-form brand—name
demand.
33APPENDIX TABLE 1
COMPARATIVE STATICS RESULTS FOR ADVERTISING MODEL
Case Assumed Sign of: Implied Sign of: a n° il dPb/dn dA/dn
1 + ÷ + +
2 - + + 7 7
3 + — + 7 7
4 — — +
S
6 +-- +
7 - +- - +
8 — — — 7 7
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